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RECEIVERSHIPS IN KENTUCKY
By W. LEwis ROBERTS*
Courts of equity sometimes find it necessary to appoint an
agent to take charge of property or to carry on a business which
is involved in the litigation before it. Such an agent is called
a receiver. Not only do we find equity judges today making
use of such agents in equity matters but we find statutory
authority for their appointment by courts and by government
officials such as the Comptroller of the Currency of the United
States, who may appoint a receiver to wind up the affairs of a
defunct national bank, or a state insurance commissioner to
appoint a receiver to manage an insurance company that has
gotten into difficulty. A receiver may also be appointed to
take charge of a bankrupt's estate until a trustee can be
selected at a meeting of creditors. Federal courts have in the
past handled the reorganization of interstate railroads through
receiverships. It is the purpose of this study to see to what
extent and for what purposes receivers have been made use of
by the courts of Kentucky in handling difficult matters that
come before them.
BASIS FOR APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER
The right to appoint a "common law receiver" was one of
the inherent powers of equity, dating back to early times.' It
still is an inherent power of equity in those states that hav6 not
purported to combine law and equity. In states that have
fused law and equity, the power to appoint receivers depends
upon statutory authorization. Such is the case in Kentucky.
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A. B.,
1903, Brown; A. M., 1915, Pennsylvania State College; J.'D., 1920, Uni-
versity of Chicago; S. J. D., 1930, Harvard. Author of various articles
in legal periodicals, and of Roberts' Cases on Personal Property (1938).
"Boonville National Bank v. Blakey, 107 Fed. 891, at 894 (1901).
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The Civil Code of Practice, sections 298-302, is the statutory
authority for the appointment of receivers in this state. The
Court of Appeals, however, seems to regard the source of the
power to be the inherent right of the chancery court to appoint
receivers. In holding that the circuit courts are the only
courts of this state which can exercise the power, the Court of
Appeals said that they are the only courts "which exercise a
general jurisdiction in equity, and the judges thereof are the
only judges of the state invested with full chancery jurisdiction
and inherent power to appoint receivers." 2  The case which
called forth this statement was one in which an intestate had
left a large amount of land and the daughter had brought a
partition suit in the circuit court against the window and two
sons of the intestate asking for the appointment of a receiver to
take charge of the land pending partition. This appointment
was resisted in the circuit court on the ground that an action
for partition was already instituted in the county court. The
circuit court judge erroneously refused to appoint a receiver as
a result of this argument. The appellate court pointed out
that a county court is a court of limited jurisdiction and can
exercise only such powers as are given it by statute, that since
it is not a court of general equitable jurisdiction and there is no
statute which confers upon it the power to appoint a receiver,
it has no right to appoint one. The court also said that the
same is true of other courts of inferior jurisdiction, such as
police courts and justices of the peace.
In another case in referring to section 300 of the Code the
court has said that this section of the code is merely declaratory
of the law applied in courts of equity in receivership proceed-
ings.3 Section 300 refers more especially to the appointment
of a receiver in regard to mortgaged property. The statement
in this case, shows, however, that the court regards the code
provisions as simply declaratory of the law at the time of its
adoption.
The order appointing a receiver is final for the purposes of
appeal but is not for other purposes and may be modified or set
aside although sixty days have elapsed after such order has
been entered. While one prejudiced by an appointment of a
2Cochran v. Simmons, 177 Ky. 562, 197 S. W. 930 (1917).
3 Young v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 258 Ky. 263, 79 S. W.
(2d) 944 (1935).
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receiver may appeal therefrom, he may also obtain relief pos-
sibly by making a motion within the proper time to vacate the
order of appointment.4 Under section 298 of the Code a
judgment appointing a receiver cannot be suspended by the
clerk's issuing a supersedeas. In the particular case in which
the court so held, the clerk of the circuit court refused to issue
such an order directing an executor of a decedent's estate to
turn the estate over to another as receiver and trustee. The
circuit court properly refused to issue a mandamus to compel
him to do so.5
The Code provision states that one having a lien or interest
in the property or fund involved in the action and the property
or fund is in danger of being lost, removed or materially
injured may move for the appointment of a receiver.6 The
appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary and drastic power
and exercisable only where the failure to appoint would cause
irreparable loss or injury, as the court has recently pointed
out.7 From this it is evident that if the party moving for an
appointment has an adequate remedy without the appointment
the court will refuse his request.8 The court has also said
that the remedy is generally purely ancillary, a proceeding in
rem, but that under proper circumstances, a receiver may be
appointed as an independent remedy and as a main object of
suit and where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties, the order of appointment cannot be
collaterally attacked.9 It follows, of course, that where the
property is not in danger of being lost or materially injured,
a receiver should not be appointed.10 Furthermore, it is a gen-
eral rule that "a receiver should be wholly impartial and indif-
ferent towards the parties interested." However, where an
ineligible person has been appointed, the appointment is not
'Fourseam Block Collieries Co. v. John P. Gorman Coal Co., 249
Ky. 710, 61 S. W. (2d) 28 (1933); McClure v. McGee, 128 Ky. 464, 108
S. W. 341 (1908).
$Thompson v. Page, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 557, 76 S. W. 128 (1903).
4Oscar C. Wright Co. v. Steenman, 254 Ky. 381, 71 S. W. (2d)
991 (1934).
'Oscar C. Wright Co. v. Steenman, supra, n. 6; Evans' Admr. T.
Clinton Bank, 244 Ky. 270, 50 S. W. (2d) 563 (1932).
sIbid, supra, n. 7.
'Scholl v. Allen, 237 Ky. 716, 36 S. W. (2d) 353 (1931); Mitchell
Machine & 'Electric Co. v. Sabin, 218 Ky. 289, 291 S. W. 381 (1927);
Elkhorn Hazard Coal Co. v. Fairchild, 191 Ky. 276, 230 S. W. 61 (1921).
' Evans' Admr. v. Clinton Bank, supra, n. 7.
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void but only voidable,1 and even then the party raising the
objection may wait too long to have the appointment set aside.12
In determining whether a receiver should be appointed the
court looks to the pleadings of both parties and if the equitable
grounds asserted in the petition are denied by the defendant in
his answer, the plaintiff must disprove them and sustain the
grounds for appointment. 13 The appointment of a receiver
is also a matter of the discretion of the court and equitable con-
ditions may be imposed upon the appointment or by order made
subsequent to the appointment.14 The court has said that the
language of the Code that a receiver "may" be appointed is
not equivalent to "must" be appointed;15 and has also pointed
out that the power to appoint should be exercised by a court
with great caution, and never indulged unless the danger of
loss or injury to the property in controversy is imminent and
the one seeking the receivership has no other adequate
remedy. 6
The question often arises when one is asking for the ap-
pointment of a receiver, whether notice must be given the other
side when one is moving for the appointment or whether thie
court can make the appointment without a hearing. To author-
ize the appointment of a receiver without notice to the defend-
ant, it must appear that the short delay necessary for the giv-
ing of such notice would result in irreparable damage to the
applicant. Although the order appointing without a hearing
may be erroneous, it is never void as the court has pointed out,
nYoung v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., supra, n. 3; East Ten-
nessee Tel. Co. v, Watson, 147 Ky. 462, 144 S. W. 375 (1912).
"East Tennessee Tel. Co. v. Watson, supra, n. 11.
3Kratz v. Moser, 250 Ky. 383, 63 S. W. (2d) 330 (1933).
m Fore's Admr. v. Fore's Heirs, 1 Ky. Opin. 498 (1866); Douglass v.
Cline, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 608 (1877); Harmon v. Kentucky Coal, Iron
& Dev. Co., 15 Ky. L. Rep. 12, 21 S. W. 1054 (1893); Woodward v.
Woodward, 17 KJ,. L. Rep. 464, 31 S. W. 734 (1895); Bashears v. Dick-
inson, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2182, 66 S. W. 1011 (1902); Cecil v. Cecil's Exrs.,
185 Ky. 787, 215 S. W. 794 (1919); Elkhorn Hazard Coal Co. v. Fair-
child, supra, n. 8; Fleming Trustee v. Virginia Mining Co., 196 Ky. 38,
244 S. W. 295 (1922); Bradley v. Bradley, 194 Ky. 60, 238 S. W. 170
(1922); Producers' Coal Co. v. Barnaby, 210 Ky. 244, 275 S. W. 625
(1925); Baskett v. Ohio Valley Banking & Trust Co., 224 Ky. 29,
5 S. W. (2d) 473 (1928).
2McClure v. McGee, supra, n. 4; Fleming, Trustee, v. Virginia
Mining Co., supra, n. 14.
26 Greasy Creek & Land Co. v. Greasy Creek Coal Co., 196 Ky. 67,
244 S. W. 85 (1922); Fleming, Trustee, v. Virginia Mining Company,
supra, n. 14.
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and one ignoring the order on the ground that it is void may
be punished for contempt. 17 In an early case,18 the court had
said that the parties to be affected by the appointment of a
receiver must have notice and an order appointing one before
the parties affected thereby were before the court, was void.
The Court of Appeals in Wison v. Jones"0 , referring to ,this
statement, said: "This is merely an instance of the unfortunate
use, or rather misuse, of the word void. The order was held
to be erroneous, and that is all that need to have been said.
That case (Price v. Price) does not sustain the proposition that
an order of appointment is void unless there has been notice.
The facts in that case showed no emergency." 'Where a vendor
sought to enforce his lien and asked for the appointment of a
receiver to take charge of the land, the grounds being set out in
affidavits of witnesses read upon the hearing, the court ruled
that the defendant should have thereafter been allowed time
to controvert the affidavits.20  He had plowed the land for the
spring planting and the court.thought that a strong case should
first be made out against him before he should be deprived of
the possession. It goes without saying, of course, that parties
filing and proving claims in an action for the appointment of
a receiver, become parties to the action under section 432 of the
Civil Code of Practice.21
WHO MAY ASK FOR A RECEIVERSHIP ?
The question very naturally arises, who may petition for
the appointment of a receiver? Creditors very often have
occasion to request such an appointment. In the absence of
insolvency or some peculiar equity, simple contract creditors of
a corporation, whose claims have not been reduced to judgment,
are not entitled to the appointment of a receiver.22  Where
the assets of an insolvent corporation are in danger of being
lost or fraudulently disposed of a receiver may be appointed
117Wilson v. Jones, 8 Ky. L. R. 510 (1886); Woodward v. Wood-
ward, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 464, 31 S. W. 734 (1895).
'Price v. Price, 5 Ky. L. R. 330 (1883).
'" Supra, n. 17.
"Chapman v. Vanover, 4 K. L. R. 254, 11 Ky. Opin. 706 (1882).
"1 Combs v. Allen, 208 Ky. 519, 271 S. W. 598 (1925).
1 Black Hawk Coal Co, v. Hazard Fruit Co., 205 Ky. 447, 266
S. W. 3 (1924).
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at the request of an unsecured creditor.2 3  Where an assign
ment was made of the debtor's property and the debtor had
made false statements in regard to his liabilities and the as-
signee refused to allow the creditors to inspect the inventory,
the court properly removed the assignee and appointed a receiver
to take charge.24 In another case involving an insolvent min-
ing corporation where there was danger of the lease being can-
celled because of the failure to pay royalties, the court ap-
pointed a receiver and the decree so appointing was held not
subject to collateral attack.25 It was error, however, to appoint
a receiver where the creditor's execution was returned with
"no property" endorsed thereon and where it was shown that
the debtor had prior thereto mortgaged her property while
insolvent for the purpose of defrauding her creditors. There
was the added fact that it had not been shown that the property
was in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured.26
The Court of Appeals also ruled that it would be improper to
appoint a receiver to take charge of the farm of a deceased
person where the evidence did not show threatened injury or
deterioration. The remedy in such a case was to sue upon the
administrator's bond.27
It is not uncommon to appoint a receiver at the prayer of a
mortgagee to take charge of the mortgaged property, especially
to have the income and earnings applied to the payment of the
mortgage debt ;28 or where there is danger of the property being
removed or materially injured.29 Where the receiver collects
funds while holding the property, the mortgagor cannot dispose
of the same nor can a creditor garnishee or attach them.30
Where a holder of a lien on three-eighths of a tract of timber
land was in danger of losing his security because the owner of
the five-eighths was cutting the timber, the court appointed a
receiver to protect the lien holder's interest.3 ' Where the affi-
3Kentucky Racing & Breeding Association v. Galbrealth, 117
Ky. 66, 25 K. L. R. 1212, 77 S. W. 371 (1903).
Goldsmith v. Fechheimer, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 433, 28 S. W. 21 (1894).
Mitchell Machine & Electric Co. v. Sabin, supra, n. 8.
Griffith v. Cox, 79 Ky. 562 (1881).
"Evans' Admr. v. Clinton Bank, supra, n. 7.
2" Douglass v. Cline, supra, n. 14.
"Newport & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Douglass, 75 Ky. (12 Bush)
673 (1877).
Ibid.
Dupayster v. Ft. Jefferson Imp. Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1782, 72 S. W.
268 (1903).
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davits filed by a lien holder showed that the defendant was
mismanaging the land and the fences were being destroyed and
these statements were not directly controverted, a receiver was
appointed to take charge of the property.3 2
The vendor who has reserved a lien for the unsecured pur-
chase money, of course, is entitled to the appointment of a
receiver under circumstances that would warrant the appoint-
ment of one in the ease of a mortgagee. If the security is suffi-
cient to satisfy the claim and there is no threatened impairment
of the lien, one should not be appointed.33 The vendee who
has paid the purchase price may be placed in a similar position
to that of a vendor with a lien. Where hemp was sold and the
purchase price partly paid, the seller neglected to stack the
same and to protect it from weather conditions. The buyer
sued to recover the money paid and asked to have a receiver
appointed to take charge of the hemp until the rights, of the
parties could be adjusted. 34 Also where the title of land is in
dispute and the one in possession is insolvent and is committing
waste or threatening to do so, the court may put a receiver in
possession until the question of title is settled.35 And the same
was true where a mechanic's lien which was not good against
remaindermen was made effective as the remaindermen were
forced by the chancellor to do equity in order to get equity.36
Ordinarily a court of equity will not interfere with the
management of a corporation. It may do so where there is
fraud and threatened danger to the minority stockholders'
interest.37 The court will not substitute the wishes of the
minority for those of the majority and appoint a receiver to
manage the corporation. It will appoint one, whether the
corporation be solvent or insolvent, where there is fraud, "gross
"Bailey v. Bailey, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 793, 10 S. W. 660 (1889).
"Columbia Finance & Trust Co. v. Morgan, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1761,
44 S. W. 389 (1898); modified in 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1761, 44 S. W. 628;
Fleming, Trustee, v. Virginia Mining Company, supra, n. 14.; Cecil v.
Cecil's Exrs., supra, n. 14.
"Summers Fiber Co. v. Walker, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 153, 109 S. W. 883
(1908).
"Collins v. Richart, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 621 (1879); Bradley v. Brad-
ley, 194 Ky. 60, 238 S. W. 170 (1922); Gabbard v. Sheffield, 179 Ky.
442, 200 S. W. 940 (1918); and Tarvin v. Walker's Creek Coal and Coke
Co., 109 Ky. 579, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1493, 60 S. W. 185 (1901).
" Rudd v. Littell, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 158, 45 S. W. 451, 46 S. W. 3
(1898).
"Venus Oil Corporation v. Gardner, 244 Ky. 176, 50 S. W. (2d)
537 (1932).
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mismanagement or dissension among the stockholders, directors
or officers, if there is no other adequate remedy,''38 or where
there is no governing body to conduct the affairs of the com-
pany.39 And where an insurance corporation was still in the
preliminary stages of organization, the stockholders were
allowed to have a receiver appointed to wind up its affairs.
The insurance department had not issued a license to the com-
pany and it was being fraudulently handled by its officers. 40
While a court of equity, in the absence of 6. statute, does not
have authority to dissolve a corporation, it may have occasion
to liquidate its affairs and the necessities of the case may call
for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of it.41 The
fact that the corporation is incorporated in another state will
not prevent the court's giving such aid.42
The court has refused to appoint a receiver at the request
of a holder of a note where the holder did not show that he
was a creditor of the corporation maker. tfe had taken the
note by way of assignment.43 Finally there is a case where a
receiver was appointed at the request of a city to enforce a lien
for taxes. The defendant in the suit conveyed the property to
one not a purchaser for value and without notice. It was final-
ly determined that the city had no lien. The appellate court
held that the appointment of the receiver was not void and that
the purchaser was entitled only to the rents collected from the
property after deducting reasonable fees therefrom for the
receiver.4 4
GROUNDS FOR AiPPOINTMENT
Section 298 of the Civil Code of Practice states the grounds
for appointing a receiver. To be entitled to this extraordinary
relief, one must have "a right to, a lien upon, or an interest in,
any property or fund, the right to which is involved in the action,
Oscar C. Wright Co. v. Steenman, supra, n. 6.
0Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S. W. 376 (1917).
10 Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co. v. Middendorf, 171 Ky. 771, 188 S. W.
790 (1916).
41 Rider v. The John G. Delker & Sons Co., 145 Ky. 634, 140 S. W.
1011, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007- (1911).
42 Scholl v. Allen, supra, n. 9.
"Kelley v. Black, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1049, 42 S. W. 738 (1897).
4City of Middlesborough v. Coal & Iron Bank, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 489,
110 S. W. 355 (1908).
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and the property or fund must be in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured."
Under this section the court appointed a receiver to take
charge of a stock of goods which had been attached in several;
different actions brought in the same court. He was ordered to
sell the goods unless the appellant gave bond that it would per-
form the judgments of the court.45 It also appointed a receiver
where a trustee was misconducting himself in handling the
estate of a lunatic. The appellate court felt that this came
within the discretion of the lower court and presumed that there
were sufficient equitable grounds for so doing.4 6
As to how far the court will go in granting motions for
receivers under this section, is, perhaps, best learned from cases
where it has declined to appoint. The fact that the appointment
of a receiver will do no harm does not authorize an appoint-
ment.47 Where the title to land is in question and it does not
appear that the one in possession is insolvent and that he is com-
mitting waste, a receiver should not be put in possession. 48
Where the plaintiff owned half the stock of a drug company and
the defendant and his wife the other half and there was a dead-
lock in the board of directors, no allegation being made of
fraud nor that the property was in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured; it was error for the lower court
to appoint a receiver to manage the drug store.49 There are
several cases where the court has been asked for a receiver to
handle the estate of a deceased person. That the executor
refused to rent land, collect rents, pay taxes, or look after the
growing of crops thereon, was held not sufficient to warrant the
intervention of a receiver; 50 nor will the insufficiency '6f
surety on the executor's bond; nor the fact that the executor is
a non-resident justify the court in appointing a reciver, and
the additional fact that the executor is mismanaging the estate
and wasting it by paying large sums in distribution and making
no effort to recover the same, tip the scales in favor of appoint-
,"Diamond Coal Co. v. Carter Dry Goods Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1444,
49 S. W. 438 (1899).
Holdbrook v. Fyffe, 164 Ky. 435, 175 S. W. 977 (1915).
"Saylor v. Hilton, 190 Ky. 200, 226 S. W. 1067 (1921); Reid Drug
Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. 522, 105 S. W. (2d) 625 (1937).
"Saylor v. Hilton, supra, n. 47.
Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, supra, n. 47.
Threlkeld v. Threlkeld, 248 Ky. 332, 58 S. W. (2d) 590 (1933).
135 ,
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ment.5 1 The court pointed out in the case so holding that the
statute provides a sufficient remedy in the case of executors.
The allegation in a petition for a receiver that an executor under
his wife's will was wasting the estate and had not made a true
inventory of the same and not setting out that he was insolvent
and was threatening to cut any more timber, was not sufficient
to justify the court in granting the petition.52 However, in an
early case a receiver was appointed where the administrator had
been tardy in settling the estate and payment by him to the
receiver completely exonerated him and his sureties.5 3
Evidence that the company's assets exceed its liabilities and
that the property is not in danger of being lost, removed or
materially injured, shows that the petitioner has no right to a
receiver. 54 Bondholders have been held not entitled to a receiver
to take possession of a railroad which was in the hands of a lessee,
the trust deed securing the bondholders not being acknowledged
until after the lease was made.5 5 The Court of Appeals ruled
that the lower court was in error in appointing a receiver to take
charge of funds in the hands of a sheriff where no allegation had
been made by the petitioner that he was in danger of losing his
debt to secure which he claimed a lien on the fund.56 The
appointment of a receiver to take charge of logs, title to which
was in litigation, the defendant being insolvent, was held errone-
ous in one case ;7 and where the insolvent had assigned for the
benefit of creditors and the trust was being so managed as t A
save expense, the court properly declined to appoint a receiver.58
Finally the court has held that it was error to appoint a receiver
to collect delinquent municipal assessments where it was not
shown that the city commissioner of public finance could not
have been directed by the court to make the collection.59
There are statutory provisions whereby employees are given
a lien on mining, railroad and public service corporation prop-
mI-ome Mission Board of Southern Baptist Church v. Wylie's
Exrs., 230 Ky. 284, 18 S. W. (2d) 1106 (1929).
42 Fore's Admr. v. Fore's Heirs, supra, n. 14.
"Floor's Exr. v. Floor, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 894, 87 S. W. 272 (1905).
Jackson Lumber & Supply Co. v. Bach, 218 Ky. 19, 290 S. W. 1055(1927).
5Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Eakins, 100 Ky. 745, 19 Ky.
L. Rep. 521, 39 S. W. 416 (1897).
1 Combs v. Breathitt County, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1247, 49 S. W. 2 (1899).
47 McClure v. McGee, supra, n. 15.
"Baskett v. Ohio Valley Banking & Trust Co., supra, n. 14.
!' City of Paducah v. White, 244 Ky. 733, 51 S. W. (2d) 935 (1932).
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erty -where such mine or corporation shuts down without paying
such employees. 60 A mining company set up as a defense to an
action to allow a receiver to operate such a mine, that the sus-
pension of operations was due to the employees' striking. The
plaintiffs rejoined that they had not been paid for two pay-days
prior thereto and further alleged that the mine was being allowed
to fill with water and their lien was in danger of being materially
lessened. The company also contended that the suspension was
only temporary and therefore the case did not come within the
statutory provision. The court appointed a receiver and sold
the property.0 1
RECEIVER'S POSSESSION IS THAT OF THE COURT
When a receiver has been appointed and has been put into
possession of property or funds, his possession is the same as the
possession of the court. No one has any right to intercept or to
prevent its being turned over to the receiver, without first
securing the permission of the court, where it has not actually
reached his hands.6 2 No one has any right to attach the same
while in his hands and a judgment dismissing an attachment of
the property after appointment of the receiver, was proper.0 3
Where a court has taken jurisdiction over property by the ap-
pointment of a receiver, no other court has the power to annul
or modify the orders of that court. A receiver garnisheed in a
suit in another county, is not compelled to obey the orders of the
court in the other county, made relative to the funds held by him
as receiver for the court appointing him. 4 The fact that he has
been named as a garnishee defendant, does not entitle him to set
up the claim of the attaching creditor as a reason for not obeying
the order of the court appointing him.0 5 Where the property
of a corporation has come into the possession of a court by the
appointment of a receiver to take charge of the same, the juris-
diction of the court is "plenary and exclusive," and the power
6*Ky. Stat., sections 2487, 2490.
"Producers' Coal Company of Kentucky v. Barnaby, supra, n. 14.
"Rowlet v. Eubank, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 477 (1867); Hazelrigg v.
Bronaugh, 78 Ky. 62 (1879).
'3Faulkner & Faulkner v. Wakenova Coal Company, 249 Ky. 459,
61 S. W. (2d) 13 (1933). But see Phillips v. Wathen, 6 Ky. Opin. 174
(1872).
"Biggs v. Robinson, 5 Ky. Opin. 16 (1871).
" Cornelison v. Gatewood, 10 Ky. Opin. 576 (1878).
K. L. J.-2
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to exchange securities is included. 60 It is the duty of the chan-
cellor to ascertain the condition of funds in the hands of a
receiver. 67  Where the receiver sold property under direction of
the court and delivered possession to the purchaser at the sale,
he is liable for the amount as it will be presumed that he received
the purchase price.68 While one taking possession of property
in the possession of a receiver might find himself in contempt of
court, such was not the case where land was sold for taxes after
the tenant moved out; the purchaser at the tax sale was not held
in contempt for taking possession under his right as purchaser.
In such case the receiver should have started suit to contest the
right to sell for taxes. Had the receiver taken possession, the
sheriff would have been obliged first to apply to the court before
holding a tax sale.69
In Wood & Co. v. Wilcox,7 ° a receiver was directed to pay
out funds he had collected. He attempted to set-off his indi-
vidual claim against the person to whom the court had directed
payment to be made. It was held that he could not do this.
And in Johnson v Gunther,7 1 a receiver failed to pay over funds
as directed after he had collected the same. When he was cited
to show cause why he should not be attached for failure to do so,
he offered to show that the appellant, to whom he was to make
the payment, was personally indebted to him for part of the
amount and that he was prepared to pay over the balance. It
was held that he could not do this as the money was held subject
to the court's orders.
POWERS OF A RECEIVER
The powers of a receiver are conferred upon him by the
court which appoints him. He has no powers except those con-
ferred by the court. He is practically without discretion and
he must apply to the court for authority to do such acts as may
be of advantage to the estate he is managing.72 Where he was
6 Jennings v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 240 Ky. 24, 41 S. W.(2d) 537 (1931).
m Gray's Exr. v. Patton's Admr., 3 Ky. L. Rep. 393, 11 Ky. Opin.
327 (1877).
"Ellis v. Carr, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 527 (1867).
'Metealfe v. Commonwealth Land & Lumber Co.'s Receiver, 113
Ky. 751, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 527, 68 S. W. 1100 (1902).
7114 Ky. L. Rep. 574 (1893).
169 Ky. (6 Bush) 534 (1870).
'Leathers v. Kelling's Trustee, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 92 (1890).
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directed by the court to sell property on credit, he had no right
to sell for cash. Where he did this at the instance of the phrfie
concerned, he was acting as the agent of the parties and not as
agent of the court, and the sureties on his bond were not held
liable for the money so received7 3 The fact that the receiver
is authorized by the court to operate a mine, does not give him
the right to take out indemnity insurance without first receiv-
ing authorization from the court and the claim of the insurer
for priority for the unpaid premium will not be allowed.7 4
Contracts made by the receiver in carrying on a business under
court authority are the contracts of the court. His duty to
preserve the property does not empower him to create debts on
his own initiative. Thus a receiver cannot make a binding con-
tract for an insolvent insurance company giving an agent a
preference.7 5 Under the earlier cases we find that it was his
duty to loan out the money in his hands on notes,76 but where
he is winding up a business it is his duty to pay the expenses
of receivership and then distribute the amount left over pro
rata among the creditors.7 7 'here he made contracts with
amusement companies for putting on performances and these
companies were to receive a certain percentage of the gross
receipts, the percentage agreed upon vested in the companies
and did not become assets of the receivership.7 8
It often becomes necessary to decide how far a receiver
can go in incurring indebtedness when carrying on a business.
Where a receiver was directed to operate a motor company
and did so for a few months at a loss, the court ordered all
the property sold and the lessor's claim of a lien on the per-
sonal property for the rent satisfied first.79 MWere the court
ordered the receiver to work a mine and to issue receiver's
certificates to meet obligations incurred in so doing, it was
sought to make the one petitioning for the receiver bear the
Is Ibid.
1 Goodin & Barney Coal Co. v. Southern Elkhorn Coal Co., 219 Ky.
827, 294 S. W. 792 (1927).
'5Moren v. Ohio Fire & Marine Ins. Company's Receiver, 224 Ky.
643, 6 S. W. (2d) 1091 (1928).
6 De Bord v. Gateweed, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 230 (1882).
' Louisville Gayety Theater Company v. Rogan, 186 Ky. 672, 217
S. W. 929, 9 A. L. R. 294 (1920).12 Ibid.
' Mountain City Motor Company's Receiver v. Mountain City Motor
Co., 221 Ky. 579, 299 S. W. 189 (1927).
KNTUCKY LAW JouxNALi
loss incurred. It was held that he was not liable since he had
no control over the receiver. Those who advanced money on
the certificates were chargeable that the mortgagee was not a
party to the suit and that their certificates were subject to his
rights.80 However, where the issue of certificates was author-
ized to displace prior liens for the preservation of the property,
purchasers of the certificates would be given priority, but the
receiver could not incur debts in continuing the business to the
prejudice of prior lienholders without their consent. Taxes,
royalties incurred under the receivership on leased lands, attor-
ney's fees, allowance for receiver, and actual expenses in pre-
serving the property were given priority over claims of the
general creditors and the lessor's royalties. The costs of a
spur track also came in ahead of the lessor's lien."' Of course
where the mortgagee has never consented to the subordination
of his claim to the receiver's certificates which are issued to
meet the expenses for running the mine, he should prevail.
The lower court erroneously subordinated his lien to the claims
of those entitled to relief under the workmen's compensation
act, certificate holders, and employees.8 2
In considering the powers of a receiver, it is pertinent to
ask whether a receiver may sue or be sued. A general receiver
may be authorized by the court to bring suit for the benefit of
the estate under his control,8 3 but he has no inherent right to
do so as he is an officer of the court with limited powers.
Although he may have a right to claim property in controversy
for the estate in receivership, he cannot counterclaim and
where he did so to litigate a disputed lien between creditors of
such estate and a third party, who claimed to have purchased
the lumber in question, a judgment in favor of the creditors on
the counterclaim was held void.8 4 Although the receiver may
collect judgments already rendered, he has no right to institute
suits without express authority from the court.8 5 The receiver,
6OCrump & Field v. First National Bank of Pikeville, 229 Ky. 526,
17 S. W. (2d) 436 (1929).
1 Montgomery Coal Corporation v. Allais, 223 Ky. 107, 3 S. W. (2d)
180 (1928).
2Freeman v. Craft, 220 Ky. 15, 294 S. W. 822 (1927).
0Mitchell v. Chenault, 112 Ky. 267, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1544, 65 S. W.
447 (1901).
rRapp Lumber Company v. Smith, 243 Ky. 317, 48 S. W. (2d) 17
(1932).
4Adams v. McAllister, 2 Ky. L. Rep. 323 (1881); Murrell's Admr.
v. McAllister, 79 Ky. 311 (1880).
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it has been held, cannot maintain an action against a bank for
damages for false and fraudulent representations as to the
insurance company's deposits whereby the insurance commis-
sioner was persuaded to give the company a certificate of
solvency and to authorize it to continue in business since the
company itself could not have maintained the action in its own
behalf."" Also where a receiver was appointed to take charge
and care for both real and personal property pending suit, the
receiver had no power to sue to set aside conveyances of the
property alleged to be fraudulent. In fact, the court itself
could not onfer upon him this power so as to bind the reaA
parties in interest. The latter should bring the action and not
the receiver.8 7 So in actions involving the title to real estate
against third parties, the receiver cannot bind the real parties
in interest without their consent. He should join them in the
action.88
Anyone wishing to sue the receiver must first get the con-
sent of the court appointing him. For instance it was held
that an action against a receiver for back taxes brought -by the
state was not maintainable without the permission of the court
which appointed the receiver. This was held true even though
that court had granted a temporary injunction restraining the
sale of the company's property at the motion of the state's
attorney, which injunction was later dissolved. The court
said that leave to sue a receiver was a jurisdictional fact.8 9
In a proceeding to compel a receiver to list funds in his hands
for taxation, it was held that the county court, under consent
of the circuit court, could compel him to list the funds.g0
It is necessary for a receiver in order to sue to set out facts
showing his appointment, the jurisdiction by which he was
appointed, so much of the proceedings to show that his appoint-
ment was legal and so state these facts in such a way that they
can be traversed. 91
"Ray v. First National Bank, 111 Ky. 377, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 717, 63
S. W. 762 (1901).
'Hogg's Receiver v. Hogg, 265 Ky. 656, 97 S. W. (2d) 582 (1936).
"Caldwell v. McWhorter, 84 Ky. 130, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 79 (1886).
Commonwealth v. Gibson Oil Co.'s Receiver, 264 Ky. 272, 94 S. W.(2d) 685 (1936).
"Spalding, Master Commissioner v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 135,
10 S. W. 420, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 714 (1889).
MRhorer, Receiver v. Middleboro Town & Lands Co., 103 Ky. 146,
19 Ky. L. Rep. 1788, 44 S. W. 448 (1898).
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A receiver may be given power by the court to sell the
property in his hands. The court in its discretion may order
all the property of a mining company sold as a whole, or such
as it sees proper. In the particular case the plant was idle and
the expense of maintaining it was large. 92 In such a case the
value of the plant as a whole may be greater than the value of
its parts sold separately. It would consequently be prejudicial
to the lienholders to sell personal property separately in such
a case, the court has ruled. 93 A judgment of a receiver's sale
binds all the parties and their privies to the suit, and the pur-
chaser at such a sale will be protected. The receiver in making
such a sale, must, of course, follow the decree of the court
authorizing the sale.94 Where the court in vacation appointed
a receiver to take over property and decreed a sale, the appel-
late court reversed the order appointing the receiver and order
of sale.95 In winding up a partnership the court appointed a
receiver to take over the property and collect the firm debts.
At the same time a sheriff sold the same property under his
attachment. The purchaser of the property at the receiver's
sale was allowed to prevail over the purchaser at the attach-
ment sale. The latter sale, the court deemed void under the
circumstances. 90 The appellate court ruled in a case of a
receiver's selling real estate of a mining company which had
failed that the sale was not void for the reason that there was a
failure to describe the land, but that it was erroneous and the
purchaser at the sale could not be relieved from the purchase
after the expiration of the term at which the sale was con-
firmed.97 Then there is the case where the purchaser at a
judicial sale was incompetent to make a binding contract.
After adjudging the salel rescinded, the court appointed a
receiver and held the vendee for the rental value of the land
for the time he was in possession and also for the costs of the
commissioner's sale.98
"Wakenova Coal Company, Inc. v. Johnson, 234 Ky. 558, 28 S. W.
(2d) 737 (1930).
"National Bank of Kentucky v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 230
Ky. 683, 20 S. W. (2d) 724 (1929).
m Brand v. Trustees of Gaylord Iron & Pipe Co., 9 Ky. Opin. 795
(1876).
9"Hurst v. Nicola Bros. Co., 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1406, 65 S. W. 364
(1901).
"Gaddis & Co. v. Ramsey, 8 Ky. Opin. 65 (1874).
"Thompson v. Brownlie, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 622, 76 S. W. 172 (1903).
"Worthington v. Campbell, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 416, 1 S. W. 714 (1886).
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Many cases have arisen where the receiver has either
directly or indirectly become a purchaser at the sale. As a
general rule a receiver should not be permitted to derive an
advantage from a purchase of claims referred to him.99 There
may be cases where the court will allow him to become a pur-
chaser. There is an instance of one holding a secondary lien
on a farm who became receiver for the same after the mortgagor
had abandoned the farm and moved into another state.
Through the mortgagor's surrender of his option to repurchase
the receiver secured the title to the property. A few years
later the mortgagor returned and tried to have the former
receiver declared a trustee of the title of the farm for his bene-
fit. In this case the court held that the debtor was estopped
to dispute the receiver's title.Doo In still another case the
court sustained the sale at which the receiver purchased the
property, saying that when the receiver considers it for the best
interest of the estate he may bid on and purchase the property
under his control and when he does so the court should not set
the sale aside unless it appears that the interests of the estate
were prejudiced by what the receiver did.1 1 Although a
receiver's purchase at a sale may be unauthorized by the court
and the proper persons might have the sale quashed, a disinter-
ested party cannot complain of the irregularity or illegality of
such sale. 102 Finally there is the case where a receiver ordered
to sell partnership property, arranged before the sale with a
third person that the third person should purchase it at the sale
and that he and the receiver should then form a partnership
to take over the property so purchased. The property was
sold for less than its actual value but the court found no bad
faith was shown on the receiver's part and did not hold him
liable for the difference between what the property was sold
for and its actual value. 0 3
The court, of course, has no power to authorize a receiver
to take possession of property beyond its own territorial juris-
diction. A case illustrating this principle involved the owner-
"Titherington's Admr. v. Hodge, 81 Ky. 286, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 211
(1883).
20 Marcum v. Wallace, 246 Ky. 726, 56 S. W. (2d) 5 (1932).
"'
01 illiams v. Owensboro Savings Bank & Trust Co.'s Receiver, 153
Ky. 789, 156 S. W. 899 (1913).
11
2Rogers v. Moore, 9 Ky. Opin. 311 (1876).
'Wagner v. Swift's Iron & Steel Works, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 273,
26 S. W. 720 (1894).
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ship of mining property in the state of Oregon. The officers
of the corporation were within the jurisdiction of the Ken-
tucky court and they were ordered to turn over the books and
property in their possession to a new board of officers and the
court erroneously went one step further in appointing a
receiver to take charge of the mines in the state of Oregon
and also enjoining the old officers and shareholders from bring-
ing suit in that state. One, as trustee for the stockholders,
filed suit in Oregon and asked for the appointment of a
receiver in that state to take charge of the property. It was
held that such person could not be punished for contempt in
Kentucky.10 4 In another case the Kentucky court allowed a
Connecticut receiver, to whom an assignment of the company's
property had been given, to take possession of property in this
state belonging to the insolvent corporation. Since the receiver
has no extra-judicial power, ordinarily he is not entitled to sue
in another state. Courts may, however, allow him to do so.' ° 5
The receiver, for instance, of a non-resident corporation may
be allowed to maintain an action in the courts of this state to
recover a debt due the corporation by a resident of Kentucky.
The court of appeals in this case said that the right was well
settled.10 6
EMPLOYMENT OF COUNSE
A receiver should secure the authority from the court to
employ counsel, but if he has not abused a sound discretion in
the matter, the court will allow him a reasonable allowance
for securing legal advice.10 7 Although he usually selects his
own attorney, it is clear that he cannot enter into a contract to
hire for compensation that will be binding on the court as it is
for the court to determine whether counsel shall be employed
and the compensation that shall be given. While evidence of
the reasonableness of attorney's fees may be admitted, the court
is not bound by it but will determine itself what is reasonable.
In the particular case the court held $3,600 was sufficient.10 8
m Kelly v. Mitchell, 98 Ky. 218, 32 S. W. 599, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 850(1895).
" Zacher v. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co., 109 Ky. 441, 22 Ky.
L. Rep. 987, 59 S. W. 493 (1900).
"'Hallom v. Ashford, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 870, 70 S. W. 197 (1902).
" Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Grommes & Ullrich, 186 Ky.
345, 216 S. W. 1078 (1919).
I"Marble v. Husbands, Receiver, 185 Ky. 605, 215 S. W. 435 (1919).
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In a case where the receiver was authorized to take charge af
coal property during litigation, the court said he was entitled to
reasonable allowance for legal services out of the funds in hand.
The court below fixed the amount of attorneys' fees and taxed
the costs and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. This was held
error by the appellate court. There were several attorneys
employed in the case and it did not appear how much was
intended for each and that the allowance could not have been
collected from the property. 10 9 In another receivership of a coal
mining company, it was held error to allow fees for the receiver's
attorney in the absence of a showing the extent of the services
rendered. Under section 396 of the Kentucky Statutes, the
court, said, it was necessary to file a certificate showing the
extent of the services. 1 0 In the same case it was held error for
the lower court to order the sale of the property free and clear
from a non-resident claim.
LIABILITIES OF RECEIVER
The receiver like everybody else is liable for his own negli-
gence. It does not follow that he will be liable for all injuries
that occur upon the property under his charge. For instance a
receiver was appointed penzdente lite to take charge of an apart-
ment house where foreclosure proceedings had been started.
The plaintiff's intestate was killed owing to the faulty construc-
tion of an elevator shaft. It was held that the receiver did not
supersede the building owner's authority except so far as care
and custody of the property taken over by him was inconsistent
with those of the owner.. He had been given no authority by the
court to change the construction of the building and was not
liable since the evidence showed he had no knowledge of the
defective construction. The court said: "If he omits to perform
or performs an official act within the scope of his authority and
in line of his duties as receiver, and thereby injures another, any
judgment recovered therefor must be against him officially, to be
paid out of the funds in his hands.""'
There are instances where a receiver may become liable for
interest on funds in his hands. If he refuses to pay them over
,l Johnston v. Stephens, 206 Ky. 83, 266 S. W. 881 (1924).
z'Continental Supply Company v. Sandy River Oil Company's
Receiver, 218 Ky. 248, 291 S. W. 49 (1927).
'u Sabiston's Admr. v. Otis Elevator Co., 251 Ky. 222, 64 S. W. (2d)
588 (1933).
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when ordered to do so by the court, he should be held for
interest.112 When ordered to collect debts due the estate, it is
his duty to use ordinary care and diligence in doing so and if he
releases the debt through his negligence, he and his surety on
his bond will be liable for the amount so lost and the burden is
on him to show facts which excuse his failure to collect. In
the particular case the loss was due to his negligence in failing
to have an execution issued.113
It has been held error to grant a motion of a receiver to
adjudge a reduction of rent, under a lease made by the owner
before the receiver was appointed. He was also held account-
able in this case for the loss of money through the failure of a
bank in which he had deposited it without the authority of the
court.114 A receiver has no right to apply the rents received
to repairs on the buildings without first securing the permission
of the court to do so. He had entered into an agreement with
the tenant to allow the cost of repairs as a set-off against the
rent. This agreement was unauthorized. For loss of rent not
due to his delay in collecting or his unauthorized act, he waO
not liable." 5 Finally there is the case where it was sought to
charge a receiver of a trust fund for the amount of a note taken
by a former receiver in a settlement made at the request of the
beneficiary and confirmed by the court at the time defendant
was appointed. There was no evidence that defendant had
been ordered to collect this note. The maker had become in-
solvent and had committed waste upon the land by which the
note was secured. Defendant, in the absence of fraud, was
held not liable for the amount of the note. 116
DUTY TO FuRNIsH BoND
A receiver should furnish a bond for the faithful discharge
of his duties as receiver and take the oath required by law
before taking up his duties as receiver. The bond furnished
must be satisfactory to the court appointing him."17 The fact
that the bond is not executed until after the entry of the order
'Hodge v. Quiry, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 650 (1887).
3' Jones v. Hudson, 6 Ky. Opin. 188 (1872).
"' Ficener v. Bott, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 632, 47 S. W. 251 (1898).
"
5 Vandergriff's Heirs v. Scott, 10 Ky. Opin. 529 (1880).
=Neel v. Carson, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 691, 37 S. W. 949 (1896).
O7 0wsley v. Cook & Co., 1 Ky. Opin. 518 (1866).
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approving it is immaterial and a bond of a receiver that he
"will faithfully discharge his duties as such and obey the
orders of the court" is binding although no obligee is named
in it.11s A third proposition laid down by the court in the
case of Sanford v. Carr n 9 was that one cannot claim the pro-,
ceeds from the receiver's sale of property and at the same time
refuse to pay the expenses of taking care of and selling the
property. Where a court named a receiver for funds belonging
to a county at the settlement with a sheriff, the court held that
it was the duty of the receiver to give a bond and his failure
to do so would relieve the sheriff from paying over the money
until he had done so. He was not a receiver, the court said,
until he had executed the bond. 120 A bond executed by a
receiver and not made payable to any particular person is in
effect payable to the commonwealth for the use of the parties
named in the bond. The cause of action against the appellant
in the particular case did not accrue until the rendition of the
judgment determining the parties entitled to the fund.12 1
L&BILITY OF SURETIES ON RECEIVER'S BOND
Sureties on a receiver's bond are liable for his failure to
discharge his duties. His failure to pay over the funds in his
hands as directed by the court will render them liable.1 2 2
A receiver was ordered by the court to sell goods on five months'
credit. The sureties sought to avail themselves of the defense
when sued that the order of the court was not signed by the
judge until after the sale had taken place. This was held no
defense. The receiver had not acted within the orders of the
court in making the sale and a creditor was allowed to hold the
sureties for the loss resulting therefrom. 123 Where a receiver
was appointed under an agreed order of the parties and he
accepted a note in payment for property sold, the administrator
of the estate was not chargeable for the amount of the note.
His sureties were held bound by the receiver's acts and liable. 1 24
" Sanford v. Carr, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 618 (1887).
I bid.
"Pate v. Hancock County, 9 Ky. Opin. 615 (1876).
"Newman v. Wickliffe's Exr., 5 Ky. Opin. 605 (1871).
Commonwealth v. Leachman, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1408, 55 S. W. 430(1900).
I"H. B. Claflin Co. v. Gibson, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 337, 51 S. W. 439(1889).
2' Carpenter's Admr. v. Demoisey, 237 Ky. 628, 36 S. W. (2d) 27
(1931).
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Sureties were held for the amount of the fund ascertained to-
have been collected by a receiver who was insolvent at the time
ef his death in the case of Rowlet v. Eubankl. 125  Of course
sureties are not precluded from showing that the money coming
into the receiver's hands has been accounted for,126 and where
a creditor having failed to file a supersedeas sought to hold the
surety of the bond for certain fees allowed a receiver, he was
not allowed to do so as his remedy was to seek a restitutioki
from the receiver as distributee of the fee. 127 Lastly we have
a case of a surety attempting to require a receiver who had
defaulted during his first term, to apply the funds in his hands
to the oldest items in the account. The court said he could not
do this. 128 The court pointed out that the cause of action
against the surety does not accrue until the receiver is ordered
to pay over the money in his hands.
RECEIvER's COMPENSATION
There is a statutory provision to the effect that no compen-
sation shall be allowed a commissioner or receiver until he fies
his written statement under oath showing the number of days
he has acted as receiver and that evidence may be heard against
the allowance. 129 This, it has been held, is mandatory except
in cases of special or extraordinary services.' 3 0 Another sec-
tion of the statutes fixes the fee of a receiver, where no agree-
ment has been made, at three dollars a day; but where he pays out
money amounting to one thousand dollars or less he is to receive
two per centum and different rates for increased amounts.131
He is also entitled to expenses connected with his duties as
receiver, traveling ;expenses and attorney's fees.182 Although
his appointment was erroneous and his appointment be set
aside, he is entitled to compensation for his services where they
10 Supra, n. 62.
15Hamilton v. Steward, Receiver, 10 Ky. Opin. 509 (1878).
127U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Adams' Executor, 232
Ky. 104, 22 S. W. (2d) 450 (1929).
'U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Shields, 157 Ky. 371, 163
S. W. 203 (1914).
'- Ky. Stat., Section 396 (Carroll's, 1936).
'St. Paul National Bank v. Hays, 252 Ky. 571, 67 S. W. (2d) 949
(1934); Hibbs v. Perkins, 206 Ky. 198, 266 S. W. 1075 (1924).
31[y. Stat. Section 1740 (Carroll's, 1936).
1 St. Paul National Bank v. Hays, supra, n. 130.
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superseded, for the time, those of the creditors' committee. 133
The court said that where the appointment exacts unusual
services in connection with the trust, the statutory provisions
as to filing a statement regarding the number of days he has
acted and also limiting the amount he can receive, do not
apply.134 The fact that bonds are made payable to a receiver
does not entitle him to the fees allowed by statute for receiving
and paying out money, unless he does in fact receive or distrib-
ute the same 35 Preparing advertisements and reporting a
sale or appearing in court several days, does not entitle him to
any extra compensation therefor.130  The receiver of an in-
solvent insurance company was allowed a fee of $6,000.137
Where a receiver in managing partnership property paid off
debts to the extent of $40,000 and turned over a like amount to
the estate at the termination of his receivership and evidence
was offered that his services were worth from $5,000 to $10,000,
the chancellor's allowance of $2,750, the appellate court said,
could not be held to be too small.' 38 For handling a distillery
business an allowance of $6,000 for the first two years was held
not "reasonable" and the court reduced it to $1,500 per year
or $3,000 for the entire service.139  Where a receiver so man-
aged a $200,000 estate as to show an increase of $36,000 and the
chancellor allowed him $15,000 for his services, this was reduced
on appeal to $10,000. In this case the statutory rule as to fees
did not apply.' 4o In another case the court refused to disturb
the chancellor's allowance of a fee of $500 for a receiver of a
firm of distillers. The appellate court said the question was one
peculiarly within the chancellor's discretion. 141 The allowance
for investing a $50,000 trust fund in government bonds, calling
Ohio Valley Banking & Trust Co. v. King, 238 Ky. 712, 38 S. W.(2d) 663 (1931).
"'bid.; also Fidelity Oil Corp. v. Southern Oil & Pipe Line Co.,
197 Ky. 676, 247 S. W. 950 (1923).
"'Wathen v. England, 102 Ky. 537, 167 S. W. 678 (1898).
3 Ibid.
u7Levassor v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co.'s Receiver, 188 Ky. 23,
220 S. W. 752 (1920).
-8Wilson v. Murphy's Admr., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 716, 110 S. W. 893
(1908).
t White v. Allen, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 1025, 11 S. W. 364 (1889).
"'Spears v. Thomas, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1154, 70 S. W. 1060 (1902).
Sherley v. Mattingly & Sons, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 289, 51 S. W. 189
(1899).
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for only fifteen days service, was $2,200.142 For, collecting about
$34,000 dollars of debts for a bank and paying out about seventy-
five percent of the same, a fee of $5,000 was regarded as reason-
able.14 3
Where a receiver has been negligent in the management
of trust funds and mingled them with his own and used them
personally, the court refused to allow him any compensation
for his services and the upper court rules that this was within
the discretion of the chancellor. 144 A receiver's fees constitute
preferred claims on the assets of the estate.145 'While the busi-
ness is in the hands of a receiver and being managed by him, it
is interesting to note that the regular manager of the company
is superseded by the receiver and the former is not entitled to
draw his salary for the time being.' 46
DISCHARGE
The termination of a receivership is a question for the
court. His discharge, however, may not release him from
liability incurred during his mismanagement of a trust. He is
discharged only to act thereafter as a receiver.147 Where the
main action is dismissed, it is error for the court to refuse to
rescind an order placing the property in the hands of a
receiver.' 48
In reviewing the Kentucky decisions on receiverships, it is
seen that a receiver is simply an agent of the court in handling
property and funds involved in litigation. His powers extend
only so far as the court may authorize him to act. Whether a
receiver shall be appointed in a particular case or not is largely
within the discretion of the court hearing the case. The fact
that the appointment will do no harm is no reason for appoint-
'43Fidelity National Bank's Receiver v. Youtley, 26 Ky. L. Rep.
340, 81 S. W. 263 (1904).
$ Stockholders of First State Bank v. First State Bank's Receiver,
159 Ky. 484, 167 S. W. 678 (1914).
"" Higgins v. Shields, 151 Ky. 227, 151 S. W. 391 (1912).
14 Grainger & Co. v. Old Kentucky Paper Co., 105 Ky. 683, 20 Ky.
L. Rep. 1491, 49 S. W. 268 (1903).
'14Hamner v. Lenox Saw Mill Co.'s Receiver, 217 Ky. 627, 290
S. W. 509 (1927').
141Erwin's Exr. v. Bedford, Grn., 3 Ky. Opin. 50 (1868).
:
1
'sCampbell v. Eversole, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 723, 38 S. W. 486 (1896).
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ing a receiver and the appellate court in such a case should
reverse the ruling of the lower court. A receiver may not only
be empowered to conserve and manage property or a business,
but he may be given authority to sell the same and distribute
the proceeds. The Code provision in regard to the appoint-
ment of a receiver, to wit, for the protection of those having
liens or interests in property which is in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured; is declaratory of the common
law in regard to receiverships before the adoption of the code';
and the power to appoint is inherent in a court having equity
jurisdiction, that is the Circuit Court in this State. A receiver
is required to give a bond satisfactory to the court appointing
him and he is liable for his negligence or mismanagement to the
parties injured thereby. He is entitled to secure legal advice
and the estate under his charge is liable for such attorney's
fees, for his own expenses and for reasonable compensation for
his services.
